Date Observed: November 9, 2026
Ecosystem: npm (JavaScript); GitHub Releases (Swarm Desktop)
Targets: Developer machines and CI runners that installed @ethersphere/bee-js@13.3.0″>bee-js@13.3.0 directly or through a dependent package; Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 users
Attack Type: Release pipeline takeover via compromised GitHub accounts; postinstall remote payload loader
Impact: Theft of Swarm wallet keystores and config; persistent backdoor on Linux and macOS; ScreenConnect remote access on Windows

Key Takeaways

  • @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 was published through Ethersphere’s own trusted-publishing workflow with valid provenance and was live on npm from 00:09:50 to 01:24:58 UTC on November 9, 2026.
  • A new postinstall hook fetches JavaScript from api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz and runs it through the Function constructor.
  • The payload sends Swarm Desktop’s swarm.key keystore and config.yaml to the attacker, then installs a platform-specific backdoor.

Introduction

On November 9, 2026, version 13.3.0 of @ethersphere/bee-js was published to npm at 00:09:50 UTC with a postinstall hook that fetches and runs a remote payload. The payload steals Swarm Desktop wallet files and installs a backdoor on Linux, macOS, and Windows. npm removed the version at 01:24:58 UTC, and GitHub issued GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf 29 seconds later.

The release came from the project’s own pipeline: a GitHub release under the bee-worker bot account triggered Ethersphere’s existing npm trusted-publishing workflow, so 13.3.0 carried valid provenance from npm Trusted Publishing. A trojanized Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 release followed. SafeDep researchers have tied the payload to the SleepyDuck/EtherDuck campaign.

Scope and Impact of the Attack

@ethersphere/bee-js averages more than 13,000 downloads per month across all versions. OX Security reports 7 of 47 downstream packages declare ranges that resolve to the compromised release. StepSecurity’s examples of ranges that permit 13.3.0 include @ethersphere/swarm-cli 3.7.0 and @ethersphere/bee-dashboard 0.37.1 .

Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 was offered to users through auto-update. The macOS build was signed as “Developer ID Application: Swarm Association” and notarized, and Windows x64 and Apple Silicon users were offered the update from 00:43:17 and 00:44:49 UTC respectively. The tag was deleted at 09:04:45 UTC.

How the Attack Works

Stage 0: Release through the trusted pipeline

An unsigned commit, de2f74e , authored as bee-worker and dated 23:59:54 UTC on November 8, carried the change. The v13.3.0 release followed at 00:06:01 UTC, starting the publish workflow. The workflow’s publish environment had no required reviewers or tag policy, so the deployment completed in 73 seconds without approval.

Swarm Foundation later confirmed that the attacker obtained credentials for a project maintainer and the token for the automated release account. How those credentials were obtained has not been established.

All 331 dist/ files are byte-identical to the legitimate 13.3.0-upcoming.g4568f7a pre-release built from the parent commit; only package.json and the loader differ.

Stage 1: postinstall loader

The commit moved node scripts/generate-version.cjs from prepare to postinstall and added scripts to the published files list. It is the first install-time hook in the package’s npm history. This is the malicious post-install script pattern: the code runs during npm install, not on import.

The script requests /v1/analytics from api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz with an X-Ethersphere : 1 header and the host OS as its User-Agent, then executes the response through the Function constructor with require and process. It times out after three seconds and suppresses request errors. The loader runs before a source-directory check, so it fires in consumer installs. The domain was registered on November 6 at 15:08 UTC.

Stage 2: Wallet theft

The payload reads config.yaml and data-dir/keys/swarm.key from the Swarm Desktop data directory and POSTs them to /v1/swarm/report. swarm.key is an encrypted Ethereum V3 keystore, and the config can contain its password. Reports state that with both files the attacker can take the node’s xDAI, xBZZ, chequebook funds, and stake.

Stage 3: Platform-specific backdoor

On Linux, the payload drops a binary in ~/.solidity/ and registers the systemd user service solidity-langsupport-runner.service . On macOS, it uses the LaunchAgent com.solidity.langsupport.runner with RunAtLoad . The implant, evjawbreaker , is a Go backdoor that reads its hub address from Ethereum contract 0xf8a900Db50b3331be6B768bA460BB59f3E40C344 through rpc.ankr.com and cloudflare-eth.com . The hub as of November 9, 193.57.9[.]155:4912, was set at 23:30:47 UTC on November 8.

On Windows, if the user is a local administrator, the payload elevates with a UACME method 39 bypass against mmc.exe , adds a Defender exclusion, and silently installs a ConnectWise ScreenConnect 25.4.3 client. The client runs as a SYSTEM service and relays to 185.232.84[.]169:8041 .

Why this Matters to DevOps and DevSecOps Teams

Whether the malicious postinstall hook executes depends on the package manager and its configuration. npm 11 and earlier and older Yarn releases run dependency lifecycle scripts by default; npm 12, pnpm 10+, Yarn 4.14.0+, Bun, and Deno require scripts to be explicitly allowed or trusted. On npm 11 and earlier, Yarn Classic, and Yarn Berry before 4.14.0, a CI job that resolved a range to 13.3.0 would run the loader. The loader also ran inside Ethersphere’s own publish job, where the workflow logs show it reaching the C2 at 00:06:20 UTC.

Treat any environment that installed @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 with lifecycle scripts enabled as compromised, including installs from caches or mirrors after npm removed the version. Search lockfiles and CI logs for @ethersphere/bee-js@13.3.0 , including transitive installs, pin 13.2.0, rotate credentials reachable from affected environments, and purge the version from internal mirrors. Removing the package does not remove the persistence, and blocking lifecycle scripts now does not remediate an earlier execution.

Why Traditional Controls Can Miss This

These gaps are specific to this release (see why traditional DevOps security tools miss CI/CD pipeline attacks):

  • Provenance verification. The provenance is valid, not forged. It attests that publish_npmjs.yaml built 13.3.0 from the attacker’s v13.3.0 tag.
  • Build-output review. The 331 dist/ files match the pre-release built from the parent commit. The change sits in package.json and scripts/generate-version.cjs .
  • Release approval. The publish environment had no required reviewers, so the release event deployed without review.
  • Payload at rest. The tarball contains only the loader. The wallet stealer and backdoor are served by api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz at install time.

How InvisiRisk Protects Against This Attack

The InvisiRisk Build Application Firewall (BAF) is a network-level proxy that brokers CI/CD communication and enforces policy on build-time behavior. Three controls apply here.

Unauthorized Destination. The loader’s first request goes to api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz/v1/analytics an attacker-controlled destination outside the expected build workflow. The InvisiRisk BAF brokers outbound traffic from protected builds and can enforce destination policy to block the callback before the payload is fetched. This also covers release workflows like Ethersphere’s, where the loader reached the C2 from the publish runner.

Unauthorized API Action. The payload then POSTs swarm.key and config.yaml to /v1/swarm/report . The InvisiRisk BAF can enforce policy on outbound API actions during builds and block unauthorized POST operations before the keystore and configuration leave the runner.

Stability Buffer. 13.3.0 was on npm from 00:09:50 to 01:24:58 UTC. InvisiRisk BAF blocks newly published packages from being consumed in a build for a configurable window, 48 hours by default. A build resolving a range that matched 13.3.0 in that period is blocked from pulling it, and the version was removed about 75 minutes after publication.

Why Build-Time Defenses Matter

bee-js 13.3.0 shipped with valid provenance from Ethersphere’s own workflow and a dist/ directory identical to the pre-release build, so provenance and build-output checks did not distinguish it. Its behavior showed at build time: a version minutes old, and an install script calling a domain registered on November 6. Build-time defenses provide two opportunities to interrupt this attack: block a newly published package before it is consumed, and block unauthorized outbound communication if malicious code executes. That is why build-time security belongs directly in the CI/CD pipeline.